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1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 0 with 
2 abstentions. 
(Alternate: Voogd), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate : 
2. Members of the Committee: Mrs. von Bothmer 
(Chairman) ; Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Abens 
(Alternate: Hengel), Ariosto, Beith, Sir Frederio Bennett, 
MM. Berrier, Brugnon, Deschamps, Druon, Faulds, 
Gessner, Gonella, Hanin, Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank 
I 
Van Watersohoot), Mende (Alternate : Vohrer), ¥innoooi, 
Mommersteeg (Alternate : Sohlingemann), Miiller (Alter-
nate : Lenzer), Pl!ridier, Perin, Portheine, Beddemann, 
Segre, Urwin. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote 
are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on political conditions for European armaments co-operation 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the production of modern armaments is necessary for the economic, military and 
political independence of Europe while hoping sincerely that the international community will eventually 
reach agreement limiting the production of and trade in arms ; 
Noting that national armies no longer provide a. large enough market for any European country 
to be able to produce armaments at competitive prices ; 
Considering that armaments industries occupy an important place in the economies of several 
Western European countries where they make a. major contribution to the maintenance of employment; 
Considering that it is evident that their work makes a. worthwhile contribution to the development 
of scientific and technical research in many fields and to the maintenance of a. high level of technology in 
Europe; 
Considering that the course of an armaments policy depends on the co-ordination of defence 
policies provided for in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
Deploring the extension of trade in arms, particularly to countries in areas where there is dangerous 
tension; 
Gratified that the independent European programme group (IEPG) has undertaken the important 
task of co-ordinating the armaments efforts of the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance ; 
Convinced that only the firm and steadfast determination of states can allow this work to be 
developed; 
Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty is the only juridical basis for the organisation of defence 
and armaments in Europe ; · 
Considering that WEU will therefore be called upon take its place in any future European union ; 
Welcoming the fact that the task allotted to the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) on 31st May 
1976 is guiding its work in this direction, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. In application of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, ensure that European armaments 
co-operation develops along lines which conform to the latest technological requirements and to the 
defence policy and strategy applied by the members of the Atlantic Alliance ; 
2. Keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means it considers appropriate, of the results already 
achieved in the study undertaken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals towards which its 
work is directed ; 
3. Ensure that the SAC has access to the sources of information it needs so that its study may be 
completed in the reasonably near future ; 
4. Study attentively the results of the study with a. view to preparing on this basis directives to be 
addressed to the appropriate authorities in member countries and to the European organisations concerned ; 
5. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of the progreBB of work in the IEPG ; 
6. Examine tho limitations which Europe should advocate in regard to exporters and importers of 
armaments and itself to prevent the trade in arms stepping up the armaments race, particularly in areas 
where peace is threatened. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Van Waterschoot, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. At its session in November 1978, the Assem-
bly debated two reports presented by the Gen-
eral Affairs Committee, one on the consequences 
of the forthcoming enlargement of the European 
Communities for the defence of Europe and for 
WEU and the other on Europe's external rela-
tions. However, circumstances prevented a major 
debate being held on the wider and more 
essential lines of Europe's external and defence 
policies. 
2. In a particularly topical manner, these two 
reports in fact expressed two political philoso-
phies which seem at first sight contradictory. One 
was highly ambitious : Europe was to be allowed 
to play a significant role in the world balance 
by asserting itself as a leading power capable 
of making its full weight felt in the search for 
solutions to problems with which the world will 
have to come to grips between now and the end 
of the century. 
3. The other implied a view of Europe whose 
influence in the rest of world would be based 
not on its ability to wield military power but 
on the idea that its very weakness would give it 
an original role, i.e. the promotion of peace and 
justice in international relations and within 
states. 
4. However attached one may be to moral and 
political values as important as the search for 
peace and detente, the extension of respect for 
human rights, the development of less privileged 
countries and the success of the North-South 
dialogue, it is not evident that the pursuit of 
these aims alone would provide a sufficient basis 
for a European policy and, even less, ensure 
Europe's security. Refusal to consider security 
problems between Europeans is obviously not 
enough to ensure peace on our continent 
and it would cut back sharply its role in the 
world. 
5. It is also questionable whether this view 
of Europe exercising an essentially moral 
influence in the world, not based on strength of 
arms, would arouse the enthusiasm necessary to 
ensure the lasting success of the cause of Euro-
pean unity, particularly among the younger 
generation. Opinion polls in the various coun-
tries in the context of the current campaign for 
the election of the European Parliament by 
universal suffrage indicate that public opinion 
is in favour of developing a Community Europe 
but also less determined than at other times to 
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do its utmost to ensure the success of the cause. 
The fact that Europe has not yet managed to 
make up its mind about matters as important 
for its present and its future as its own 
defence is certainly partly responsible for this 
relative lack of interest in the European cause 
among a large part of the population which 
nevertheless seems favourably inclined towards 
Europe. 
6. In short, the question is whether the prepa-
ration of a more elaborate European policy in 
foreign affairs and defence matters has not 
become essential to the success of economic and 
political co-operation destined to lead to the 
constitution of the European union which all 
our governments declare to be their aim. 
7. Your Rapporteur therefore considers it 
extremely important to place in a somewhat wider 
context all matters relating to European arma-
ments co-operation and particularly the sym-
posium to be held in Brussels in October 1979 
and to examine whether such co-operation is 
necessary before studying the general economic, 
social and politicaL implications of developing 
such co-operation. This he feels is the role of 
the General Affairs Committee whose report must 
therefore avoid overlapping with those to be 
presented by more specialised committees. 
ll. Western Europe and the armaments 
problem 
8. · For several years, the world has witnessed 
a growth in what is known as the arms race. Its 
multiple aspects are in no wise limited to Europe 
and the two superpowers but stretch over a large 
part of the earth, including the Middle East, 
Eastern Asia and to some extent Africa. Only 
Latin America, although not completely out of 
it, seems to be playing but a modest part. 
9. According to World Military Expenditure 
and Arms Transfm·s 1967-76 published by the 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency in July 1978, military expenditure 
throughout the world in 1976 is believed to 
represent 5.8 % of the world GNP, i.e. the 
equivalent of what the world spends on education 
and more than double what it spends on health 
(2.4 %). But whereas the percentage of GNP 
earmarked for defence in the industrialised 
countries has dropped sharply in the last ten 
years, it has risen in the underdeveloped coun-
tries which, as a whole, spent as much in 
1976 on defence as they .did on education and 
health combined. These are only averages and 
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some countries show considerably higher 
figuresl.. 
10. However, prospects offered by the United 
Nations General Assembly special session on 
disarmament held in 1978, hopes of peace aris-
ing from the Washington treaty between Egypt 
and Israel and the favourable evolution of 
SALT II are pointers that in the next few years 
the limitation of armaments and, in certain cases, 
disarmament will at last enter the field of reality. 
It is evident that a general slow down in military 
expenditure might have sweeping repercussions 
on the growth rate of developing countries if they 
managed to allocate more of their GNP to 
productive investment and if the industrialised 
countries set aside slightly more of theirs for 
assisting the third world. These are prospects 
which cannot be overlooked in a European policy 
concerning the production and sale of arms since 
any limitation of the arms race can but foster 
both the maintenance of peace in Europe and 
the development of international trade in. which 
Europe plays a major part. 
11. Among the several reasons for the arms 
race, a prominent one is of course the confronta~ 
tion between the two blocs. So far, the agree-
ments on security and co-operation in Europe, 
the SALT I agreements and SALT II negotia-
tions, as well as the MBFR talks, have failed to 
bring about any reduction in the build-up of 
I • .According to The Military Balance 1978-79 pub-
lished by the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, the percentages of GNP spent on defence are 
given as follows : 
(1) Atlantic Alliance 
United States : 6 ·% Netherlands : 
5. 7 ·% Federal Republic : 
5 '% Belgium : 
Turkey: 
United Kingdom : 
Greece: 5 '% Italy: 
France: 3.6% 
(2) Warsaw Pact 
Soviet Union : from 11 to 13 ·% 
3.6% 
3.4% 
3.4'% 
2.4'% 
Other countries : from 5.9 % (GDR) to 1.7 % (Romania) 
(3) Rest of Europe 
Yugoslavia : 5.2 % Sweden : 3.4 ·% Others : less than 2 % 
(4) Middle East 
Israel : 29.9 % Jordan: 
Egypt: 22.8% (in 1974) Iran: 
Syria : 16.4 % Iraq: 
(5) Asia 
15.5% 
10.9% 
10.2·% 
10.5 % Singapore : 6.3 '% North Korea: 
China: 8.5% Pakistan : 4.6 % 
8.3% •••••••....•••..•••.•••. Taiwan: 
South Korea : 6.5 % India : 3.1 % 
Peru: 
Argentina: 
Venezuela: 
(6) Africa 
Nigeria : 7.8 ·% 
Rhodesia : 7. 7 % 
South Africa : 5.1 % 
(7) Latin America 
3.1 % Brazil : 
2.8 % (1976) Colombia : 
1.4% Mexico: 
1.1% 
1.1% 
0.6'% 
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armaments ; at the very most it has been chan-
nelled in certain directions. But hostilities out-
side Europe, the need for security or the ambi-
tions of certain powers have led them to procure 
large quantities of the latest equipment. The 
Yom Kippur war in 1973 illustrated the danger 
such weapons might constitute for international 
peace and the need for those who felt threatened 
to increase and modernise their equipment. 
Another reason is probably the status states or 
governments may expect to gain by possessing 
a modern army. 
12. However, the role played bY. industrialised 
countries in . this race should not be under-
estimated : as producers, they often derive con-
siderable revenue from arms exports which help 
to maintain the balance of payments which had 
been in jeopardy since the rise in the price of 
oil and raw materials after the October 1973 war. 
The sale of arms is now more than ever a major 
factor in the trade battle between our countries 
and for economic reasons they more or less close 
their eyes to the drawbacks and dangers involved 
in the spread of modern weapons in areas where 
peace is often uncertain. For some, arms sales 
may be part of their policy for keeping a check 
on their customer countries and for others merely 
a question of winning markets as in the case of 
any other product. 
13. But in the West other reasons encourage 
an aggressive search for external outlets for the 
armaments industries, one being that national 
armies can no longer absorb the· full output of 
armaments producers in their own countries and 
the other member countries of the Alliance do 
not always provide an additional market. They 
therefore look elsewhere for additional markets 
and any drop in their exports might jeopardise 
their ability to produce at competitive prices. 
Their concern to- keep their production capacity 
intact makes them increasingly dependent on . 
their customers. 
14. The armies of the West are now faced with 
the need to take important decisions affecting the 
future of the armaments industries. They have to 
take account of the considerable build-up of 
armaments by the ·warsaw Pact forces in recent 
years. In spite of the redeployment of Soviet 
forces to the East, facing China, the Warsaw 
Pact has acquired undisputed superiority over 
NATO forces in the West (primarily in the 
central sector) and to an ever increasing extent 
on the northern and southern flanks, particularly 
in tanks and aircraft. If only as a deterrent and 
for their defence policy to be effective, the NATO 
countries must make a considerable effort to 
equip themselves with armaments capable of 
meeting attacks which are backed by tank and 
air support. In a work published in 1977, 
L'Europe sans defense, a Belgian general was 
able to contend that, with the armaments then 
available, NATO forces were incapable by con-
ventional means of preventing a Soviet offensive 
reaching the Rhine within three days. Presum-
ably there is no question of equalling the number 
of tanks and aircraft deployed by· the eastern 
countries but of acquiring the means of defence 
needed to counter them, which implies con-
centrating research and production on new 
weapons which will play a major role in the 
armies of tomorrow : precision-guided missiles, 
enhanced radiation weapons, lasers, etc. 
15. This new course would require a consider-
able increase in sums earmarked for investment 
in all the western armies. To this end, since 1978, 
the NATO countries have agreed to increase their 
defence budgets by 3 % per year in constant 
value. This is a valid increase but it will not be 
enough if it not used rationally to have the 
maximum effect on NATO's defensive strength. 
16. Europe therefore has to meet contradictory 
requirements : on the one hand, it is clear that 
the world as a whole is expending too great a 
proportion of its intellectual, economic and 
financial resources on the production of arma-
ments which, although leading to useful spin-off 
in many fields, is in itself sterile.- A large amount 
of money, work and grey matter which might be 
more usefully employed in research, particularly 
into new sources of· energy, food or medicine, 
is employed in the manufacture of highly-
sophisticated instruments which in the best of 
cases will pile up in silos, hangars and depots 
until they become obsolescent and are sent to 
the scrapyard, which, after all, is b~tter than 
having to use them. But, on the other hand, 
such waste seems essential to the maintenance 
of peace and security in Europe. No serious 
attempt can be made to limit it without endanger-
ing the credibility of the West's deterrent 
capability which means being able to meet every 
threat by the most appropriate means : if it is 
acknowledged that the first requirement of any 
rational policy is to ensure the security of the 
population, no pennypinching in the means of 
doing so can be considered acceptable. 
17. The problem now facing the West is how 
to cut down waste and ensure ma.ximum security 
at least cost. This is all the more essential since, 
at the present difficult juncture in the West, 
security efforts are often misunderstood and 
hard to accept in the eyes of the public even 
though the armaments industries may help to 
limit the the problems of unemployment now 
troubling most European countries 1 • It must 
1. It is extremely difficult to obtain detailed, accurate 
information on the numbers employed in the armaments 
industries since many firms producing modern weapons 
or components for weapons systems also work for the 
civil sector. This is the case inter alia for the aircraft, 
automobile and electronics industries and even, to a 
certain extent, naval shipbuilding and explosives. It is 
with some reservation therefore that the following figures 
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therefore be shown that such expenditure is 
neither useless nor excessive, and that it is not 
a burden on the countries' balance of payments. 
Thus, any procurement of expensive weapons 
today is normally offset by purchases made by 
the selling country in the buying country. 
18. At the present juncture, everything indi-
cates that, at least within the Atlantic Alliance, 
this situation is beneficial mainly to American 
arms producers who can take advantage of the 
large_ market represented by the United States 
army to offer items on outside markets for which 
the overheads (including research and the 
development of prototypes) can be spread over 
very long production runs, whereas ·European 
industries have to cover their overheads in the 
far smaller numbers ordered by their national 
armies. Compared with their American com-
petitors they are therefore in a poor position on 
the markets of their European partners. The 
situation seems even worse when the compensa-
tion aspect is studied. Since smaller numbers of 
finished products are produced in Europe at 
higher cost, the number of parts and components 
purchased in exchange has to be increased 
accordingly in order fo offer equal compensa-
tion. The phenomenon of the scale of the economy 
therefore operates doubly in favour of American 
producers as compared with their European com-
petitors, which explains their frequent trade 
successes in Europe itself in recent years. Such 
successes h~lp to limit still further the outlets 
available to European producers and extend 
American outlets and therefore accelerate a 
process which would quickly relegate European 
industry to a secondary, sub-contracting role to 
the benefit of its American rivals. 
19. Hence, it is not surprising that European 
countries which are the most capable of supply-
ing the more sophisticated weapons should find 
themsel,ves forced into options which may some-
times be regretted. The choice they have is : 
(i) to promote sales to non-member coun-
tries of NATO, particularly those 
which, for political reasons, are not 
prepared to procure American weapons 
- or to which the United States refuses 
or may refuse to sell certain weapons ; 
this obstructs the elaboration of a joint 
policy by NATO member countries on 
many international questions, includ-
ing those affecting the Middle East, 
and might lead to the progressive 
destruction of the cohesion of the 
Alliance; 
are quoted for numbers employed in the armaments 
industries : between 160,000 and 300,000 in France, the 
Federal Republic and the United Kingdom and between 
15,000 and 80,000 in Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. 
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(ii) to accept co-production agreements 
with American firms on terms which 
leave them little say in the latter's 
decisions; 
(iii) to resign themselves to producing only 
a limited number of types of weapons 
for which they are sure of having a 
wide-enough market, even if they have 
to rely on the United States to pro-
duce other equipment needed for 
western defence. This option, like the 
previous one, can but reduce the 
capability of European armaments 
industries and eventually, in view of 
the steady and fast-moving progress 
of technology, make Europe incapable 
of producing many of the weapons it 
needs for its defence for lack of invest-
ment and sooner or later for lack of 
technological know-how. The last two 
options would thus mean leaving the 
United States permanent responsibility 
for Europe's defence and complete 
control over it. 
20. The Americans seem to have realised these 
difficulties and for several years have been seek-
ing solutions. -
21. One step is for the establishment of a two-
way flow of trade in armaments between Europe 
and the United States. In 1978, it led to the 
signature of a series of bilateral agreements 
between the United States and European mem-
bers of NATO to encourage reciprocal procure-
ment of armaments on the basis of free competi-
tion. It is clear that these agreements fall well 
short of providing a satisfactory solution to the 
essential problem, i.e. the survival of a European 
armaments industry, because they do not guaran-
tee that the American armed forces will purchase 
European equipment but merely seek to allow a 
free market which in this case favours American 
manufacturers. 
22. Moreover, the two-way street is interpreted 
differently on either side of the Atlantic : Europe 
considers that the aim is to achieve a balance of 
arms procurement and sales between· the Euro-
pean and American partners, whereas the United 
States tends to seek a balance between imports 
and exports of money spent on the defence of 
Europe, which includes on the American side of 
the scales the cost of maintaining American 
armed forces on the mainland of Europe. In this 
way, the overall balance would show a deficit for 
the European partners in the field of armaments 
proper. 
23. However, in the United States itself many 
now consider that the maintenance of a major 
armaments industry in Europe contributes to 
the cohesion of the Alliance as a whole. But 
although some feel that protecting this branch 
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of the European market may encourage organised 
production and markets in Western Europe, 
others on the contrary consider that Europe will 
only manage to achieve this if it is forced to do 
so by the merciless laws of the market. 
24. Thus, insofar as the forces of the Atlantic 
Alliance would have to co-operate closely in the 
event of war and as such forces must be avail-
able to SACEUR in accordance with operational 
needs, it is essential to achieve the highest pos-
sible degree of interoperability in the framework 
of the Alliance, i.e. it must be materially possible 
for the holder of a weapon of whatever origin 
attached to a unit of a country of the Alliance 
to have access, anywhere in the Alliance's armed 
forces, to supplies of munitions, spare parts or 
fuel, or to be able to use its means of communica-
tion to contact its partners thanks to unified 
standards, calibres and specifications. This is an 
operational necessity apparently recognised by 
all members of the Alliance but still far from 
being achieved satisfactorily in national armies. 
25. This is not a matter of standardisation 
which would imply a far greater degree of 
unification of weapons and equipment in use. 
Some members of the Alliance, including France, 
are afraid that this concept, based on practical 
and operational considerations, may, if applied, 
mean European armies being fitted out with 
American equipment since each time decisions 
had to be taken in this field the weight of the 
United States plus that of countries procuring 
American equipment would inevitably be greater 
than that of European manufacturers. But would 
the reaction of these countries be less negative 
towards a European standardisation of arma-
ments, perhaps starting with a limited number 
of categories of weapons Y Such an operation 
should have the immediate effect of favouring 
European producers on the European market 
and in the longer run improve Europe's position 
in negotiations with the Americans on standard-
isation extended to cover the whole Alliance. 
Should it not prove possible to make a serious 
effort to obtain standardisation among the Euro-
pean members of the Alliance, it may well be 
wondered whether they have any choice other 
than to conclude the most advantageous agree-
ments possible for the purchase of American 
equipment. 
26. However this may be and whatever attitude 
the United States eventually adopts, as matters 
now stand everything indicates that an effort 
should be made to organise production among 
the European members of the Atlantic Alliance. 
There is now little doubt about this and, in many 
fields, industrialists are making the effort them-
selves - in aircraft, naval shipbuilding (mine-
sweepers) and missiles for instance. Yet, co-
operation between states and military head-
quarters is still far from adequate, despite a 
whole series of attempts made in the last thirty 
years, most of which have so far produced no 
decisive result. 
27. Although neither the North Atlantic Treaty 
nor the modified Brussels Treaty defines the 
elements of a common armaments policy, they 
have both provided frameworks for trying to 
work out and organise such a policy. 
28. (a) FINABEL was set up in 1953 by the 
chiefs-of-staff of the French, Italian, Belgian, 
Netherlands and Luxembourg armies, joined by 
the Federal Republic of Germany in 1956 and 
the United Kingdom in 1972, with the aim of 
defining the nature of army equipment require-
ments, working out specifications jointly, con-
ducting joint tests and holding exchanges of 
information. 
29. (b) 'rhe WEU Standing Armaments Com-
mittee, set up in 1955 by the signatories of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, was given a first task 
of promoting agreements on the joint production 
of armaments by member countries. In addition, 
in 1976 it was asked to make a study of Euro-
pean armaments industries. 
30. (c) When the idea emerged in NATO of 
forming a European nucleus, which became 
Eurogroup, the latter set up a sub-group of arma-
ments directors, EURONAD, in which represen-
tatives of all the European members of the 
Atlantic Alliance except France take part. 
31. (d) At the end of 1975, the members of 
Eurogroup formed the independent European 
programme group, in association with France. 
'!'his is not an institution any more than Euro-
group and has no secretariat. There is an annual 
meeting of under-secretaries of state of partici-
pating countries, meetings of national armaments 
directors and of experts. The latter have three 
tasks: 
('i) to prepare lists of equipment in use 
in national armed forces, replacement 
schedules and the equipment that 
might be used for replacement ; 
(ii) to study co-operation between member 
countries in a number of specific 
projects; 
(iii) to examine procedural and economic 
problems which have to be solved if 
co-operation is to be effective, e.g. com-
petition, technology transfer, com-
pensation, trade, industrial co-opera-
tion and procedure for developing new 
weapons systems. 
32. (e) Finally, the importance of bi- or multi-
lateral programmes carried out by certain mem-
ber countries should be underlined, particularly 
in the aircraft and missiles industries. So far, 
such undertakings have given the best results 
where production is concerned. 
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33. With the exception of this last case, it is 
clear that results achieved are in no way com-
mensurate with the effort· made: although 
FINABEL's aims were modest, this was not so 
for the SAC, yet its work has come to little, 
although it may take credit - to a degree dif-
ficult to assess - for much of what has been 
achieved at bi- or multilateral level since the 
SAC on the one hand has made national 
authorities come to grips with the problem of 
European co-operation and on the other it has 
brought together qualified representatives from 
the Defence Ministries. Finally, provided there 
is sufficient good will to facilitate its task much 
may be expected of the study which it is making 
of European armaments industries about which 
today only partial, abridged and inadequate 
information is available. 
34. Eurogroup, for its part, has now lost much 
of its reason for existence where armaments are 
concerned since the IEPG has so to speak taken 
its place, but it is yet too early to review the 
group's achievements since it was formed so 
recently. It should be pointed out, however, that 
some believe it will play a leading role in the 
near future but information available about its 
effective working fails to confirm this optimism 
in view of the difficulties it seems to be encoun-
tering in tackling economic problems and the 
small number of specific projects which seem to 
be taking definite shape. 
35. Apart from these efforts at institutional 
level, it should be added that in this respect the 
WEU Assembly for its part has constantly played 
a driving role by urging the governments of 
member countries to promote European co-
operation in armaments matters. Numerous 
reports, symposia organised by the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions and by the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments and approaches made 
by many of its members to their countries' 
authorities all add up to shape what may be 
called a true Assembly doctrine, over and above 
the inevitable differences which emerge from 
time to time regarding the possible ways and 
means of such co-operation. 
36. On the ultimate goals, it has in fact always 
been widely agreed that the aim of European 
armaments co-operation was to maintain and 
increase Europe's capability in this field so as 
to strengthen its general economic potential and 
improve the effects of efforts made by each 
state for the common defence and to ensure that 
Europe was more independent of American pro-
duction so that it might be better able to take 
upon itself the options which are essential for 
its defence. · 
37. The problem of armaments cannot be 
separated from the more general question of 
defence. policy and the strategies adopted by the 
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Atlantic Alliance and also from their use as 
envisaged by nationaL military staffs. An arma-
ments policy is not built on purely technical or 
industrial bases but is designed to provide the 
armed forces with the means they need to fulfil 
their role. Yet, it would appear that, apart from 
limited forces assigned by a few countries for 
possible distant attack, all the forces of the 
Western European countries would have to be 
deployed or in any case exercise their deterrent 
effect on the same terrain in the event of 
hostilities. From this point of view, the situation 
of France, which is outside the NATO integrated 
command system, is no different from that of the 
other "\V estern European countries since France 
has its place in the second line of western forces 
deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
38. There is every reason to think that the 
requirements of these forces on the same battle-
field will be identical and that a weapon which 
is suitable for one European country will also 
be suitable for all the others. It would therefore 
seem logical for all the Western European coun-
tries to have the same weapons, and in this case 
the principle of economy of scale would apply to 
the full. Indeed, the growing cost of sophisticated 
weaponry forces each national army to use less 
of a given item of equipment. For instance, the 
number of aircraft deployed by most European 
countries is considerably less than just before the 
second world war. 
39. It has therefore become much more costly 
to set up production lines and it is also taking 
much longer to do so. Once lines have been set 
up, the cost price of each finished item becomes 
higher as runs become shorter in view of the vast 
sums needed for what is now known as research 
and development. The fact that the Western 
European countries have in the last ten years 
had to reduce drastically the proportion of their 
gross national product earmarked for defence 
makes them wait longer than desirable before 
replacing obsolete equipment, to the detriment 
of the efficiency of their forces. 
40. It would therefore seem quite logical for 
these countries to pool their resources, · efforts, 
research and technology for the design, develop-
ment and production of what might be a uniform 
item of equipment. It may naturally be con-
sidered that the American armed forces deployed 
in Europe have requirements similar to those of 
European troops and that there might therefore 
be co-ordination at Atlantic level. However, 
American military authorities have to plan the 
deployment of their forces not at European level· 
but at world level. At one time, many American 
forces were deployed in Vietnam. The United 
States is now considering sending troops to the 
Near or Middle East. They must be prepared for 
fighting on the shores of the Pacific or of the 
Atlantic, in polar or tropical regions and in a 
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very wide range of climate, vegetation, terrain 
and population. 
41. For instance, for the Vietnam war the 
American army developed a large number of 
new types of weapon. The American military 
authorities therefore have to equip their forces 
with more polyvalent weapons than those needed 
by the European forces or with a far wider 
range of weapons. Joint production of armaments 
by Europeans and Americans is not impossible. 
Most "\V estern European countries do so on a 
bilateral basis in a manner corresponding to their 
respective economic structures, and in 1978 
several of them signed agreements with the 
United States for developing trade in this field. 
But it cannot be as general or complete as it 
might be between European countries. 
42. The fact is that there is no lack of bodies 
responsible for co-operation but twenty-five 
years' work are far from having produced con-
clusive results. 
43. There are various reasons for this slowness 
or even failure. 
(a) Political reasons 
44. Possibly some countries, an.xious to retain 
a degree of independence vis-a-vis their allies, 
are not kindly disposed towards too much 
standardisation which would make them 
dependent on foreign suppliers for some of their 
weapons. However, too much importance should 
not be accorded to such reasons. Indeed, ~ranee, 
which has steadily proved to be the country with 
the greatest concern for its independence of 
decision, is also one of the most zealous in organ-
ising joint production of armaments by Euro-
peans in such bodies as the SAC or the IEPG 
and through bilateral agreements. 
(b) Commercial, economic, social and financial 
reasons 
45. In 'recent years, the European countries 
with the largest production of the most varied 
armaments have developed a policy for sales of 
arms abroad 1 • This is the case inter alia of 
1. Statistics on the arms trade are usually fairly 
unreliable and do not always tally. According to 
Die W eZt of 19th April 1979, in 1976 this trade repre-
sented a sum of $13,300 million. It reported that the 
principal exporters were : 
United States : 
Soviet Union : 
France: 
Federal Republic of Germany : 
The principal inlporters were then 
countries : 
Iran: 
Israel : 
Iraq: 
Libya: 
$ million 
5,200 
3,700 
840 
636 
Middle East 
$ million 
1,400 
947 
765 
741 
Pra1icc, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the United Kingdom. They were encouraged in 
this direction by the increase in the price of oil 
and a number of raw materials which forced 
theni to increase sales of manufactured products 
including armaments, in order to stabilise thei; 
balance of payments. This led them to view the 
armaments they produced no longer merely from 
the point of view of Europe's defence but also 
from that of possible markets .. Particularly in 
countries which are not large-scale exporters of 
armaments, there are growing complaints about 
sales of armaments which at least part of public 
opinion considers to be dangerous for inter-
national peace, whereas the governments of 
exporting countries often seem anxious to retain 
a free hand in this field. This does not facilitate 
the co-ordination of the production of armaments 
between European countries, although the diffi-
culty must not be exaggerated since certain 
jointly-produced armaments, such as the Jaguar 
training and tactical support aircraft, have found 
good markets abroad. 
46. Conversely, even in Europe there sometimes 
seems to be the utmost difficulty in finding 
purchasers for armaments produced in Europe. 
Preference often goes to armaments produced 
abroad, particularly in the United States, because 
of their lower cost or more rewarding industrial 
compensation, which factors carry considerable 
weight among purchasing countries. In recent 
years, this was the case for a number of aircraft 
deals, particularly in Belgium and the Nether-
lands. 
47. But it must be observed that in the absence 
of organic co-operation between producers of 
aeronautical equipment in 'Vestern Europe 
these countries have had to choose between bids 
not from Europe but from individual European 
countries and the United States. Decisions were 
reached in the light of national interests because 
the bids were national bids. In several of the 
most important cases, national interests led them 
to opt for the procurement of American equip-
ment and this will probably always be so as long 
is their industries are not directly involved in 
equipment produced by the whole of Europe 
rather than by a single European country. As 
long as production conditions remain unchanged 
there is every reason to fear that Europea~ 
solidarity will not be enough to allow govern-
ments to purchase, perhaps at a higher cost 
equipment produced by European industries. ' 
48. This leads to a third aspect of the economic 
obstacles to the joint production of military 
equipment by the European countries. Such pro-
duction would certainly involve a far-reaching 
restructuring of firms and it is to be feared that 
this might lead to a drop in the overall level of 
employment. The crisis prevailing in Europe 
9 
DOCUMENT 802 
since 1973 has made it very sensitive to such 
consequences. However, it must be borne in mind 
that in the longer term rationalised production 
far from limiting employment possibilities: 
improves them insofar as it makes European 
products more competitive on the European and 
world markets. 
(c) Juridical reasons 
49. The status of armaments industries differs 
from one 'Vestern European country to another 
since some parts are nationalised and others are 
privately-owned. Moreover, whatever their status, 
states have had to keep tight control to prevent 
clandestine exports of armaments and to ensure · 
the maintenance of production capacity whatever 
the economic situation. 
50. Progress in European economic integration 
is now reaching company rights, but those pro-
ducing armaments have very largely escaped 
Community intervention, for instance where 
regulations protecting free competition are con-
cerned. It would therefore seem essential if any 
progress is to be made towards wider co-operation 
to attain some degree of uniformity of state 
control methods and procedure, labour legislation 
and protective regulations in order to ·achieve 
joint production on the basis of inter-firm or 
inter-state agreements or through the creation 
of multinational groups for the development of 
new weapons. One of the aims of the symposium 
to be held in October might be to determine how 
such joint production could be organised. 
51. Here, mention should be made of the 
WEU Council's instructions to the Standing 
Armaments Committee in May 1976 to under-
take a far-reaching enquiry for the purpose of 
studying and analysing the European arma-
ments industries. According to information com-
municated by the Council, the Standing Arma-
ments Committee has completed the section of 
its enquiry on the juridical aspects. It is regret-
table that the Council did not consider it desir-
able to transmit to the Assembly more infor-
mation on the contents of this chapter as it 
promised in reply to Recommendations 293 
and 299. The question is probably not to ask the 
Council to communicate to the Assembly the full 
text of a report written for governments since 
this might incite some of them to be restrictive in 
supplying the SAC with the information it needs 
for pursuing its enquiry. However, it would be 
natural and highly desirable for parliamenta-
rians, who have to give their views in their own 
countries on the adoption of defence budgets and 
hence on matters relating to the procurement of 
armaments, to have as much information as 
possible about the prospects of European co-oper-
ation in this field. 
52. In any event, the mandate given to the 
SAC is clearly defined, since : 
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(i) although set in the context of "pos-
sible rationalisation on a European 
scale", it calls for "a descriptive 
analysis of the situation", thus depriv-
ing the SAC of the right to submit any 
form of recommendation. As such, this 
is already a considerable and 
absolutely new task ; 
(ii) the enquiry is limited to a "definition 
of the armaments sector", the "collec-
tion of economic data" and a study of 
the "legal status of firms and domestic 
legislation", i.e. it takes no account of 
other types of obstacle ; 
(iii) the SAC is asked to "take account1 in 
particular, of the tasks undertaken" 
by the IEPG without specifying how 
far the SAC's study is to depend on 
results achieved by the IEPG, parti-
cularly in the definition of standards 
on which to b~se its definition of the 
armaments sector. 
53. However this may be, it is quite clear that 
apart from the points raised in the SAC mandate 
there are other obstacles whose importance should 
not be overlooked, as implied by the Council in 
its reply to Hecommendation 309 : 
"The sole purpose of the study at present 
being carried out by the Standing Arma-
ments Committee is to describe the econo-
mic and legal position of armaments indus-
tries in member countries. It is not required 
to include any political assessments or con-
clusions leading to the regulation of the 
sale of arms ... " · 
(d) Military reasons 
54. It is difficult to assess the role military 
reasons have played, but it would appear to be 
considerable. This is due to the high degree of 
independence enjoyed by each country's military 
authorities. They all have their own traditions, 
staff, working methods and equipment replace-
ment schedules. Financially they depend on 
national budgets and must obtain the sums they 
require from national parliaments or govern-
ments. They define their requirements in the 
light not only of the needs of an overall Euro-
pean defence but also of all these factors and 
the role of these factors in decisions taken must 
not be underestimated. The only remedy would 
be to compel military authorities to define their 
requirements together, to agree on the type and 
specifications of the equipment they need for the 
years to come and to set up a body capable of 
taking decisions in the event of differences and 
disputes in order to define equipment adapted 
to the needs of a European army in stages to be 
determined jointly and in advance. 
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55. One of the tasks of the independent Euro-
pean programme group is to J;Ileet these require-
ments and its Panel I has the specific task of 
taking stock of requirements on the basis of 
NATO defence plans. But the IEPG seems to be 
progressing only slowly towards the definition 
of equipment, however valuable its work may be, 
and there is probably no reason to doubt this 
even if available information on the matter is 
very sparse. This is probably due to the fact that 
armaments experts taking part in its work do 
not sufficiently commit the military authorities 
for which many other factors and constraints 
count very strongly. The logical solution would 
obviously be to set up a European military 
headquarters, i.e. a European army. It is hardly 
possible to consider this at present, so the search 
if not for a solution at least for an improvement 
in the present situation should be made through 
increased consultations between national military 
authorities. 
56. Failing such arrangements, it is to be 
feared that attempts by government experts to 
align national definitions in forums such as the 
SAC, Eurogroup and the IEPG will never 
achieve anything more than mediocre results. 
ID. European defence and defence of Europe 
57. Now, as thirty years ago, much ambiguity 
still surrounds the aim pursued by those who 
speak of Europe. Is it a step towards a wider 
form of society, western today, world-wide 
tomorrow, in which the state in its traditional 
form would be destined to decline Y Or, on the 
contrary, is state power to be strengthened by 
separating it from over-narrow national societies 
and adapting it to the needs of this century ? 
Are national entities to be strengthened so as 
to hold each other up in a confederal system in 
order to allow them to face the twenty-first 
century Y The first option seems the most 
rational, the most in conformity with a moral 
philosophy which refuses to set the state or 
nation on a pedestal and offers the best prospect 
for the fulfilment of mankind. 
58. But can one act as if the triumph of 
universal reason was sufficiently certain and 
anticipate the decline of the state Y What would 
be the worth of a policy which was not based on 
a strict analysis of the facts and on an assessment 
of the threats and the means of meeting them Y 
Should the future be planned as if the security 
of an international system was guaranteed Y Con-
sideration· of collective security, i.e. each coun-
trJ:'s defence policy, cannot be dispensed with. 
59. In Europe, such a policy no longer has to 
lean on feelings once thought of so highly. For 
the people of Europe, war is no longer a means. 
of pursuing a policy ; the aim of defence is to 
ensure the survival of the population by avoid-
ing war. It must therefore be stripped of all the 
finery surrounding military things and tackled 
with the coolness of the chess player. 
60. What is to be defended is the possibility 
for the society in which we live to determine its 
own present and its own future. Who is threaten-
ing it Y Those who might be tempted to determine 
them in its stead either by enclosing it in a 
system which would progressively stifle its 
freedom of action or by threatening to use force 
to make it come to terms. Faced with this twofold 
threat, all Europeans are in an identical position 
even if they do not see it in the same way 
because they have all inherited costly and inef-
ficient institutions from the past : a conscript 
costs more than a horse guard but is probably 
no more useful when faced with nuclear missiles. 
61. An attempt may be made however to define 
a few guidelines : 
62. (i) The aim of any defence policy in Europe 
is to deter attack. 
63. (ii) The essential element of deterrence is 
the strategic nuclear weapon. 
64. (iii) Europe alone does not have a strong-
enough nuclear deterrent. It therefore needs an 
external deterrent. 
65. (iv) The external deterrent is not enough 
since it is not conceivable that the United States 
should risk the destruction of its cities for the 
sake of meeting a limited attack on European 
territory. 
66. ( v) It must therefore be completed by a 
limited deployment of forces designed merely to 
deter local attacks by demonstrating that Europe 
can and will stand firm and any escalation would 
involve the risk of nuclear war. The numbers 
deployed should not be too great since this would 
weaken the deterrent by increasing the prob-
ability and credibility of limited hostilities. They 
should be limited enough to show that Europe 
cannot allow its fate to depend on the outcome 
of one battle but strong enough to show that it 
is determined to defend itself. 
67. (vi) To play its role, this limited deploy-
ment must be efficient, i.e. it must have the 
backing of the most appropriate weapons 
constantly adapted to the needs of a doctrine 
which takes account of the possibilities of the 
latest weaponry. Thus, to offset the enormous 
superiority of the Warsaw Pact in tanks and 
aircraft, it is not necessary to have an equivalent 
number of tanks or aircraft but: 
(a) a defensive doctrme allowing the chal-
lenge to be met ; · 
(b) weapons to back up this doctrine ; 
(c) officers and men fully conversant 
with this doctrine and these weapons. 
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68. All information currently available on the 
deployment of NATO .forces indicates that for 
political reasons there is some confusion as to 
the type of doctrine which would be applied in 
the event of attack, that all sides are hesitant 
to use some of the weapons known to be the most 
effective, that officers are often trained in 
accordance with out-of-date doctrines and that 
the troops are far from having mastered the usc 
of modern weapons which which they are more-
over not always equipped. 
69. However, the cries of alarm raised in 
certain military circles in recent years have not 
gone unheeded. It is clear that consideration of 
the possibilities of rethinking strategy has 
developed in a particularly remarkable manner. 
For the first time since the second world war, 
this has not been a purely American or Soviet 
phenomenon but has spread to Western Europe 
where defence research institutes have been 
increasing in numbers for the past fifteen years 
and there has been a renaissance, if not of a 
doctrine, at least of an endeavour to take account 
of present-day political, military, economic and 
technical data. A bibliography of reviews and 
other publications on this research published in 
recent years would be very long. The symposium 
organised by the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments of the WEU Assembly in 1977 
illustrated the work of advanced industries in 
the armaments field. The slight increase in sums 
earmarked for investment in the defence budgets 
of most of our countries and the redeployment 
of some of their forces show a definite will to 
adapt to new circumstances. Are these efforts 
enough Y ]'or many reasons, it is doubtful. 
70. (vii) While the defence of Europe is based 
on strategic deterrence and tactical deployment, 
it is evident that at the present juncture strategic 
weapons are held by a small number of powers 
and for various reasons this situation will not 
change for a long time to come. On the contrary, 
Europe is forced to consider what might be the 
battlefield in the war of tomorrow so as to 
exercise the supplementary deterrence needed for 
the credibility of overall deterrence. This is the 
field in which the inost spectacular progress has 
been made in recent years both in nuclear and 
conventional weapons ·and in the doctrine for 
their use. Most probably, the development of the 
strategic arms limitation talks, by blocking 
strategic armaments, helped to guide research 
towards what are known as the grey zones. 
71. (viii) Europe currently has the means to 
back up this policy which it. has been pursuing 
successfully for the past · thirty years. But . it 
could pursue it more cheaply and effectively 
if it managed to transform the de facto solidarity 
of European firms into a common defence under-
taking. It is prevented from doing so by the 
heavy burden of national pasts: what with the 
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fears of smaller countries, which prefer the 
hegemony of far-away America to that of a 
powerful neighbour, speculations about the 
prestige conferred on larger countries by their 
relative force, nostalgia for past glories and 
established positions in military headquarters, 
everything opposes a cool analysis of aims and 
means. 
72. This does not mean that there is no basis 
for co-operation between Europeans in defence 
matters because, in 1954, the modified Brussels 
Treaty instituted WEU. The task of the WEU 
Council was to promote continuing consultation 
between governments, necessary if the essential 
provision of the treaty was to work properly ·: 
the automatic assistance clause in Article V. But 
very soon - in some instances from the outset 
- WEU relied on other bodies to exercise a 
number of its responsibilities : NATO for defence 
matters, the Council of Europe for cultural and 
social affairs and the EEC, once Britain became 
a member, for economic affairs. Its role has there-
fore been confined to ensuring that these 
responsibilities were really exercised by the 
organisations to which they had been entrusted, 
account being taken of the fact that WEU does 
not have the same membership as the European 
Community nor the same way of working since 
it has no supranational elements nor the same 
powers. It does not form part of the European 
Community except insofar as the treaties of 
alliance provide an essential basis for any com-
mon European policy in any field whatsoever. 
73. The weakness of the European pillar of 
the Alliance is an element of imbalance in the 
Alliance and of division between Europeans. 
Attempts to remedy this, such as the Harmel 
plan, have had only partial results. For the 
defence of Europe, American and European 
views do not necessarily concord. The first aim 
of any American government is the survival of 
the United States and its inhabitants. This may 
result in a strategy rather different from what 
Europeans would like, involving a more ready 
acceptance of the possibility of a limited war 
whereas for Europe any war, even limited, would 
be catastrophic. Again, Europeans know that 
there is every chance that their territory will 
become a battlefield in the event of hostilities 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
and therefore they wish NATO to pursue an 
offensive strategy - which does not mean an 
aggressive defence policy- to avoid fighting on 
their territory. Conversely, the United States can 
accept a strategy which tolerates more flexibility 
in the use of space to allow more effective use 
of its armed forces. 
74. Naturally, for many years, the North 
Atlantic Council and the NATO Defence Plan-
ning Committee have been used for discussions 
between allies on these strategic concepts. The 
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Europeans have obtained considerable advantages 
there such as the adoption of the forward stra-
tegy. But they may still wonder how far the 
means at the disposal of NATO in face of the 
massive deployment of forces in Eastern Europe 
are in a position to guarantee the application 
of the principles on which the allies have agreed. 
In point of fact, they can hardly complain 
because their contribution to the common defence 
effort, in spite of increases in 1978, is still less 
than that of their American allies and a fortiori 
than that of the Soviet Union or the Eastern 
European countries. 
75. The search for detente and above all the 
limitation of nuclear weapons alsq brings out 
different points of view among Europeans and 
Americans. 
76. (i) There are differences over the nature 
of the balance which must be organised and 
maintained. Whereas the first preoccupation of 
the United States is the maintenance of an 
overall balance between the strategic nuclear 
weapons of the two great powers, Europeans are 
primarily anxious that NATO should continue 
to wield the means necessary for local deterrence 
in Europe. The development of new weapons in 
recent years and decisions taken by the United 
States Government to limit their development -
for instance, in the case of the neutron bomb -
raise problems for the Alliance which yet seem 
far from solution. 
77. (ii) In another respect, the Soviet Union 
seems keen on having the third round of SALT 
include western nuclear armaments as a whole, 
including those of France and the United King-
dom, in the overall calculation of the strategic 
nuclear potential of the western partners. For 
the moment, France and the United Kingdom 
seem reluctant to have their military arrange-
ments included in negotiations between the two 
great powers, even if they were to be more 
closely consulted by the United States in the 
course of such negotiations. 
78. (iii) Finally, in the case of detente proper, 
there have sometimes been sharp differences 
between American views and those of certain 
European countries about the nature of the 
provisions of the Helsinki final act. Europeans 
have tended to lay greater stress on the pro-
visions which concern non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of states whereas the United 
States has laid particular emphasis on those 
relating to respect of human rights. 
' 79. Admittedly, there is nothing fundamental . 
in these differences and they in no way call in 
question the principles on which the Alliance 
is based. Nevertheless, the very different weight 
carried by the European states on the one hand 
and the United States on the other within the 
Atlantic system and throughout the world makes 
it very difficult for consultations between allies 
on problems relating to the general course of the 
Alliance to operate smoothly. 
80. These various considerations indicate that 
the defence field is the one where the greatest 
differences still exist between members of the 
European Community. It was not by chance that 
the EDC failed but for deep-rooted reasons 
whose effects are still felt today: France's recent 
request to its partners to change the respons-
ibilities of Euratom to make Community activ-
ities compatible with the development of its 
own nuclear force is further proof. As long as 
this situation prevails, it would be dangerous 
for the future of the European union to link 
defence policy too closely with the Community 
institutions. First, certain countries would very 
probably object from the outset. Subsequently, 
if a few immediate results were achieved, they 
might be called in question shortly afterwards 
and, what is more serious, result in the overall 
Community achievements being challenged. 
81. This does not mean that Europe should 
neglect joint and detailed examination of its 
defence, it is merely that one should not rush 
into linking this examination too closely with 
the institutions of the European Community. 
This observation is not unrelated to a study of 
the prospects of European co-operation in arma-
ments matters. 
IV. Organisation of Europe and defence 
problems 
82. The question obviously arises as to what 
extent a European armaments policy can or 
should be the business of the European Com-
munity. It would be undeniably logical for the 
European Community, which is responsible for 
co-ordinating the whole of Europe's economic 
policy, to take the place of states for armaments 
production and trade as it has done for the 
coal and steel industries, nuclear energy and 
agriculture. This point is strongly emphasised 
in the report on European armaments procu-
rement co-operation submitted to the European 
Parliament by Mr. Egon Klepsch, Rapporteur 
of the Political Committee, on 8th May 1978 
(Document 83/78). In adopting this report, the 
European Parliament called on the Commission 
"to submit to the Council in the near future a 
European action programme for the development 
and production of conventional armaments within 
the framework of the common industrial policy". 
83. However, if suggestions are to be made 
only if there is a possibility of applying them, 
the fact must be faced that the armaments 
industry has a number of special characteristics 
and, however necessary it may be, here European 
co-operation runs up against difficulties which 
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have been described in the previous chapter. 
It is already evident that the Commission is 
hardly equipped to respond to the invitation of 
the European Parliament and there is every 
reason to think that the Council of the Com-
munity would not, at the present juncture, wish 
to take over such a programme, on the one hand 
because the Community now includes one coun-
try, Ireland, which would not agree to take part 
in a joint defence policy and on the other because 
France has so far refused to discuss in the 
Community framework any matter relating to 
defence. It already showed its radical opposition 
to the procedure envisaged by Mr. Klepsch when 
the latter submitted his report to the IEPG. 
Answering a written question put by a member 
of parliament on the subject, Mr. Barre, French 
Prime Minister, said on 18th December 1978 : 
"... The Chairman of the IEPG reported 
on this visit at the meeting of the group 
held in Rome on 3rd October at the level 
of national armaments directors... at the 
express request of the French Delegation 
the group did not take note of Mr. 
Klepsch's report but only of the statement 
by the Chairman." 
Answering a question by another member of 
parliament on 14th December 1978, Mr. Fran~:ois­
Poncet, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
said: 
" ... the European Economic Community 
can neither have nor acquire responsibilities 
in respect of defence policy. Armaments 
policies, which naturally form an essential 
part of defence policy, are also a matter 
for member states. As far as the govern-
ment knows, the Commission has not con-
tradicted this interpretation although cer-
tain of its members noted that the EEC 
might, by taking industrial and customs 
policy measures, assist in the elaboration 
of a European armaments policy. The 
government has already had an opportunity 
of specifying in reply to other questions 
on the same subject that it is determined 
to oppose any attempt by the ComJpunity 
institutions to take action in a matter 
which is outside the field of application 
of the treaties. It notes that no proposal 
of this kind has been made." 
84. As pointed out by your Rapporteur, Euro-
pean armaments policy is not solely an emanation 
of industrial policy and although he is convinced 
that it must take its place in the future European 
union this does not necessarily imply that the 
Community must take it over in the immediate 
future. So far, European governments have 
organised co-operation in this field outside the 
Community framework and these efforts must 
neither be slowed down nor a fortiori broken off 
because of an institutional difference. On the 
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contrary, an examination must be made to see 
how they can be increased and made more 
effective at the present juncture. 
85. It is quite evident that the nine-power 
political consultations bringing together the 
members of the European Community form the 
framework in which this common external policy 
essential for the effective development of joint 
production of armaments can be worked out. 
However, in these consultations, the Nine have 
not yet tackled matters relating directly to the 
defence of Europe either because some of them 
do not wish to consider such matters outside 
NATO or because others do not want to become 
too closely linked with NATO through the inter-
mediary of these consultations. 
86. Conversely, the North Atlantic Council 
holds many consultations on such matters, but 
NATO covers only a clearly-defined area whereas 
crises and tensions are on the increase outside 
this area. Most European countries have 
interests in or links with other parts of the 
world, but they vary considerably from one 
country to another. On the other hand, the 
United States now has world-wide interests and 
responsibilities which means that through its 
action anywhere in the world it commits allies 
who pay only a fairly remote role in formulat-
ing decisions which nevertheless concern them. 
87. The reactions of the European public to 
the Vietnam war are a demonstration of this 
weakness. But one may wonder whether more 
recent crises in Africa, the Middle East and 
the Far East may not further upset at least 
a part of European public opinion. 
88. Such difficulties have apparently already 
affected the process of consultation in NATO. 
Atlantic News No. 1101 of 23rd February 1979 
analyses the progress of consultations as follows : 
"It is on questions outside the NATO 
region that allied cohesion disperses, and 
- which is more serious - there is resis-
tance by certain nations to any attempt to 
formulate even an agreed NATO analysis 
of such problems, much less an agreed 
NATO position or policy for action by the 
'Vest. Any member nation is of course 
free to raise any subject for discussion that 
it wants to, but that is as far as the matter 
can go. Other nations can - and do -
state that they will only listen to the 
discussion, that they will make no con-
tribution to it, and that they will, in effect, 
veto any effort to formulate any Alliance 
analysis or solution regarding it. Certain 
nations do this consistently. Others do it 
variably, according to what 'extra-NATO' 
problem is raised. 
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This in turn has led to discussions in 
Alliance circles as to whether or not the 
traditional NATO policy of acting only on 
consensus (that is, unanimity) of all mem-
bers is still relevant to the new challenges 
coming at the West from regions outside 
the NATO area. 
Dr. Henry Kissinger articulated the prob-
lem precisely in an interview· published in 
the International Herald Tribune last 
December. He said, 'We and our allies 
must have a capacity for regional defence 
inside and outside the NATO area. If we 
do not develop this, then in the eighties 
we are going to pay a very serious price. 
The first instalments are already visible'." 
89. The attempt to hold consultations on a 
more restricted basis as at the summit meeting in 
Guadeloupe in January 1979 does not seem to 
have produced conclusive results. Reports avail-
able indicate that there was no prior consultation 
either in the framework of NATO or among 
the Nine, which is . all the more regrettable in 
that many European members of the Alliance, 
not to mention Canada, were not represented. 
The concept of a directorate of the larger powers 
replacing a faltering Europe cannot be a solution 
to the questions raised by co-operation between 
the United States and its European partners. 
90. The greatest uncertainty therefore hovers 
over the way a European foreign policy can be 
worked out from the moment it is a question of 
defence. Consequently, Europeans often find 
they are unable to assert their views on questions 
discussed in the framework of NATO because 
there is no European policy on such matters : 
concepts which are to become those of the 
Atlantic Alliance are prepared in Washington 
and the European policy of the United States 
Government is then to induce its European 
partners, one by one, to endorse its views, not 
because it wishes to stifle a European voice -
it has often urged Europeans to organise them-
selves - but because, in the absence of a clear 
response from Europe, it can hardly do other-
wise. 
91. Moreover, on questions relating to common 
security but not the responsibility of NATO, the 
absence of consultation sorely paralyses Europe 
or, even worse, sets Europeans against each other 
on matters over which they do not, a priori, . 
fundamentally disagree. This was evident in 
1977 during the disturbances in Za'ire. Both 
France and Belgium sent limited forces to carry 
out missions in Kolwesi. But the two missions 
were based on different concepts and appeared 
to compete with each other whereas everything 
called for joint action by the Western European 
countries to ensure the repatriation of Euro-
peans and help to restore peace in the area. 
The consequences of conducting two ·operations 
might have been most serious and Europe should 
do its utmost to avoid any recurrence. 
92. It is precisely for matters which do not 
concern NATO, because they are not related to 
the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, 
or the Nine, because they relate to security, that 
the WEU Council is, under the modified Brussels 
Treaty, obliged to meet and consider measures 
to be taken under Article VIII, paragraph 3, of 
the treaty: 
"At the request of any of the high con-
tracting parties the Council shall be 
immediately convened in order to permit 
them to consult with regard to any situ-
ation which may constitute a threat to 
peace, in whatever area this threat should 
arise, or a danger to economic stability." 
93. In none of the other treaties now associat-
ing the Western European countries are there 
any equivalent undertakings and although it is 
quite right for the WEU Council to rely on 
wider organisations to exercise those of its 
responsibilities which they can exercise, it is still 
committed to intervene directly when the prob-
lems arising are not within the purview of these 
bodies. The Assembly has asked it to act on many 
occasions, particularly when it adopted the 
recommendation in the report presented by Mr. 
Leynen on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee in November 1975 (Document 680). This 
was also the sense of the address by Mr. Michel 
J obert, then French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, on 21st November 1973. As long as no 
other European organisation has effective res-
ponsibilities in these matters, the proposals he 
made on that occasion and which were endorsed 
by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, French Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs, and Mrs. Hamm-
Briicher, Federal German Minister of State, at 
the Assembly's last session, retain their full 
importance. The French Minister said : 
"For an undertaking in the interests of 
security such as I have attempted to out-
line, with detente allied to defence, Western 
Europe Union has its part to play and 
is not without importance. 
I do not forget that· the treaty setting 
up WEU created an alliance among seven 
European countries. If all, its members 
were in agreement, WEU could constitute 
a valid theatre for the thinking and talks 
which I have just suggested. These, today, 
are more necessary than ever, for Europe 
must now concern itself with a future 
which may not be very distant. It must, 
in any case, concern itself with strategic 
developments themselves, which have called 
into question so many programmes that 
we go on pursuing more through wishful 
thinking than from conviction. 
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... Why, for example, should the horizon 
of our thinking, and indeed of the organ-
isation generally, not be widened, both in 
detail and as a whole, so as to take on a 
real European dimension Y" 
94. Possibly members of the European Par-
liament may wish to use the new authority 
deriving from their election by direct universal 
suffrage to have the Community authorities 
intrude in armaments, if not defence, matters. 
There seems little chance of their succeeding, 
but should they do so, it is to be feared that the 
governments may take advantage of the fact that 
the European Community binds them to no for-
mal commitment in this field to evade sooner or 
later any form of control or co-ordination which 
they do not consider to· be in their immediate 
interests. 
95. Compared to this, under the modified 
Brussels Treaty the seven signatories accepted 
specific commitments in defence and armaments 
policy. Signatories are bound by Article IX, 
under which the WEU Assembly's responsibility 
covers the application of the whole treaty, which 
means, as the Council has often recalled, that it 
is the only European parliamentary assembly 
with responsibilities in defence matters. It 
receives a report from the Council and is there-
fore entitled to be kept informed of the activ-
ities of the Standing Armaments Committee 
which depends on the WEU Council. 
96. But while it is true that the Council's 
responsibilities may be exercised by other organ-
isations such as the Council of Europe, the Euro-
pean Community for economic matters and 
NATO for defence questions on which it reports 
to the Assembly, this should also be true of the 
IEPG whose prerogatives come within the Coun-
cil's responsibilities. It is therefore perfectly 
logical and in conformity with the modified 
Brussels Treaty for the WEU Council to report 
to the Assembly on the work of the IEPG. · 
97. In 1978, the Council assumed quite a clear 
commitment in this sense when, in answer to 
Recommendation 319, it affirmed that : 
" ... the duty which belongs to the Council 
alone of informing the Assembly on all 
aspects of the application of the modified 
Brussels Treaty forms a major aspect of 
their political activities. 
The Council therefore intend to meet the 
Assembly's request for fuller information 
on consultations between member countries 
on matters relating to the application of 
the modified Brussels Treaty ... " 
98. Answering Written Question 191, the 
Council, in the enigmatic style of which it is so 
fond, stated that : 
"With regard to the joint production of 
armaments, the Assembly was informed 
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that the Council had begun a study which 
resulted in the mandate adopted in April 
1977, calling on the Standing Armaments 
Committee to undertake the study now in 
progress of the situation in the armaments 
sector of industry in the WEU member 
comitries. 
With due regard for the confidential nature 
of their deliberations, the Council will con-
tinue to inform the Assembly in the 
appropriate manner of any questions raised 
by the member governments in this con-
text." 
99. It may however be wondered whether the 
seven WEU governments would be prepared for 
the IEPG to report directly to the Assembly. 
If not, consideration should be given to what 
their true objective was when they sought to 
develop European armaments co-operation in the 
framework of new organisations which had no 
ties with international institutions or treaties. 
The sparse results achieved in these unofficial 
bodies do not even allow t~em to quote efficiency 
as a reason. Is it not just a question of avoiding 
parliamentary control because the seven govern-
ments are unable to agree on the type of infor-
mation they may communicate to a parliamentary 
assembly since their consultations on such matters 
are still in a state of gestation f 
100. However this may be, WEU is still the only 
European assembly with defence responsibilities 
and the only truly European institution with 
the task of keeping watch on the application of 
a treaty of alliance between European countries, 
and one day or another it would be desirable for 
this treaty to be merged with those establishing 
the European Commnity so that defence matters 
may take their place in the future European 
union. The fact that WEU has not yet carried 
out fully the task entrusted to it by the 
signatories of the 1954 agreements does not 
mean, as is sometimes implied, that it has a 
contagious disease. It is the governments that, 
for various reasons, ove.rt or covert, have not 
wished to make the most of the instrument they 
gave themselves. There is no reason to think that 
they would agree to do something outside this 
framework which they do not wish to do inside it. 
101. In any event, Europe must be allowed a 
future in defence matters by keeping intact the 
treaty itself and the bodies responsible for apply-
ing it. To claim to consider the treaty as negli-
gible compared with the Atlantic Alliance and 
the WEU Council as pointless compared with 
nine-power political consultations would a priori 
deprive Eurqpe of the only grip it now has on 
defence matters and consequently jeopardise the 
future European union. It is not by neglecting or 
16 
destroying what already exists that the future 
of Europe will be prepared, but, on, the contrary, 
by developing it and making the most of what the 
treaties as they now exist offer for organised 
co-operation. 
V. Conclusions 
102. Behind this at first sight rather limited 
problem of co-ordinating the armaments produc-
tion and co-operation of European industries is 
the far wider problem of what kind of Europe 
it is possible and desirable to build today, since 
these matters involve the national responsibilities 
to which states are the most attached. Today, 
everything indicates that the store set by some 
in the building of a federal Europe cannot come 
to fruition immediately and at best the Europe 
of tomorrow will still be confederal. Defence and 
armaments are still the most serious obstacle in 
the way of European union. 
103. But whatever its framework, Europe will 
have to meet the requirements of its population, 
particularly in terms of employment, the econ-
omy, the standard of living, protecting the 
environment and energy. But it must be given 
the means to do this. European co-operation must 
not be just a question of dividing the burden 
of a world crisis on the various national econ-
omies but a means of overcoming the effects of 
this crisis by improving the organisation of pro-
duction and a better division of employment and 
consumption. It is clear that the armaments 
industry has its place in such a Europe even if 
it must remain outside the responsibilities of the 
European 9ommunity for some time to come. 
104. Europe 'vill also have to rise to the aspira-
tions of the younger generations who, in the 
over-narrow confines of the national states which 
are a legacy of the last century, no longer find 
room for developing their initiative and hopes. 
They are showing growing concern about the 
limited prospects available. 
105. It is not in the type of international 
co-operation in which Europe's industrial role 
would be reduced to one of subcontractor of 
greater or lesser importance that Europe would 
be able to provide work for its research workers 
or technicians' for very long. It must retain all 
its creative possibilities if it is to stop a brain 
drain that has threatened its future for a long 
time already. Just as it will have to come to 
grips with all the problems relating to energy 
production, it will have, if it wishes to keep 
control of its future, to assume responsibility for 
everything relating to its armaments and, more 
generally, its security, even if this has to be in 
the framework of an alliance and in close co-oper-
ation with the United States. 
106. Your Rapporteur did not wish to go further 
into this subject as he knew it was to be con-
sidered in greater depth by the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions, on a report by Mr. Valleix. He will there-
fore merely emphasise that, apart from its 
military and economic aspects, the joint produc-
tion of armaments brings into play a whole series 
of political factors which he has sought to describe 
in this report, the main one being the independ-
ence of the Europe of tomorrow, i.e. its ability to 
retain responsibility - in the framework of the 
alliance with the United States, admittedly- for 
matters relating to its own defence and its role 
in the world. 
107. Your Rapporteur has attempted to list the 
obstacles which have stood in the way so far : 
practically all of them are tantamount not to a 
refusal, but to an absence of political will which 
has allowed too great a role to be played by the 
protectionist reflexes of nationalised or private 
firms and the states themselves or even of admi-
nistrative departments which are in principle 
under the political authority of the state but are 
often skilful in asserting special or limited 
interests. In the case of armaments, this is often 
so for military authorities. But insofar as the 
production of armaments involves many indus-
trial firms it should be noted that in many cases 
the latter do nothing to help to form the groups, 
mergers or consortia necessary for joint produc-
tion. From this point of view, nationalised firms 
seem no more flexible or co-operative than private 
firms and may sometimes be suspected, on the 
contrary, of benefiting from their situation by 
confusing their own short-term interests with 
those of the public. This means that a political 
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will clearly expressed by the state authorities 
might, in most cases, overcome these obstacles. 
But such a firm will is only too rarely apparent. 
108. Undeniably, progress in the study by the 
SAC in the framework of WEU will be a 
criterion of the governments' will. How much 
assistance, documentation and information will 
they provide for this study which they themselves 
commissioned Y Information obtained so far points 
to very little. And then, once the study has been 
completed, if it is not lost in the sands of time, 
which is still to be feared, what use will the 
governments make of it Y If they file it in their 
archives without trying to work out an effective 
policy for armaments co-operation on the basis 
of its results, this will mean that the step taken 
in May 1976 will, at best, have been only a 
passing impulse with no future, or perhaps too 
an operation designed to deceive public opinion 
and let it be thought that there was a desire to 
succeed which was, in fact, inexistent. On the 
basis of its conclusions from the study, the Coun-
cil should draw up directives to be addressed 
to all responsible authorities, both civil and 
military, national and international, so that it 
may be considered that it is applying the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty in armaments matters. 
109. European armaments co-operation cannot 
therefore be considered as a purely military 
matter, nor purely industrial. It is both, but it 
is above all political, and the future of a Europe 
which can exist only if it proves itself adult and 
responsible, even in areas where it would be 
easier to keep silent, largely depends on the 
efforts and sacrifices which \viii effectively be 
made by all concerned to allow progress to be 
achieved. 
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